A vital lesson that actor-network theory has taught us is that entities normally classed as -technical‖ contribute crucially to the construction of -society.‖ Amongst the many entities that play that role are the mathematical models deployed in financial markets.
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This brief note explores this -still underappreciated -aspect of the performative (Callon 1998) role of models.
It is very easy to imagine that a model will be adopted and retained if it is empirically accurate (if, in particular, patterns of prices conform at least approximately to its postulates), and discarded if it is found not to be an accurate representation of price patterns or market processes. But a model's empirical accuracy as a representation (even empirical accuracy generated performatively by the use of the model itself, as in the -Barnesian‖ performativity of the Black-Scholes option pricing model that is the central hypothesis of MacKenzie 2006) is only one virtue that a model may have, and sometimes not the most important one (Millo and MacKenzie 2009 The process emphasized by Barnes and Dupré, coordination, is a crucial aspect of social order, and thus of society, though mathematical models are not usually thought of as contributors to it. How do models facilitate coordination in financial markets? One important way is that models make it possible to simplify, talk about and orient action towards phenomena that in the absence of the models would remain at best complicated and at worst latent and invisible. The Black-Scholes formula, for example, can be used to simplify options -which are complicated financial instruments 2 -by working backwards from the market price of options to the volatility (the so-called -implied volatility‖) of the 3 underlying asset consistent with those option prices. A host of different instruments are thus reduced to a single underlying metric (sometimes the price of options is quoted not as a dollar amount but as an implied volatility level), and a previous latent and invisible phenomenon (the aggregate of market participants' expectations as to the extent to which prices will remain stable or fluctuate wildly) is rendered visible.
At the heart of the credit crisis is a family of models, the Gaussian copula, which a recent article (Salmon 2009 ) calls -the formula that killed Wall Street‖ and describes as -fatally flawed.‖ What's striking about the history of this model -which will be addressed in detail in MacKenzie (in preparation) -is that it was always -fatally flawed,‖ in the sense of being empirically inaccurate, and was known to be so from the moment it came into widespread use. CDOs -collateralized debt obligations, the instruments that the Gaussian copula models;
to reach shared assessments of risk or shared views of implied volatility or its Gaussiancopula analogue, base correlation; and so on), one either has to return to the canonical model or face daunting practical difficulties of communication. Black-Scholes or the Gaussian copula is an Esperanto, and a widely-shared Esperanto is far too valuable a coordination device to be surrendered readily.
Just as it's too easy to think of a model as a representation, it's also too easy to think of it as an abstraction or a purely mental entity. Black-Scholes and the Gaussian copula, however, are material devices, and their materiality is external as well as internal to human brains. In this respect, there's a subtle difference between the two models. For important classes of options, the Black-Scholes model has analytical solutions, in other words solutions that can be written down as explicit mathematical expressions. The
Gaussian copula has such a solution only in a special case, 4 and in consequence computerized techniques are needed: either -semi-analytical‖ methods such as fast Fourier transforms and numerical integration or full Monte Carlo simulation. Two market participants who employ the Black-Scholes model with the same agreed 4 The special case (Vasicek 1991 ) is that of a single-period CDO or other pool of debt instruments, which consists of a large number of highly granular assets with identical pairwise asset-value correlations.
MacKenzie (in preparation) will discuss the failed attempt by J.P. Morgan to make this special case the market Esperanto.
parameters will thus in practice produce close-to-identical option values or implied volatilities, even if using different material devices to generate the solution: the material implementations of arithmetic are homogeneous enough. 5 In contrast, typical differences in the material implementations of semi-analytic or Monte Carlo techniques mean that two participants using the same version of the Gaussian copula with the same inputs will often generate base correlations or values for a CDO tranche that differ to an extent that, while small, can nevertheless be consequential. This has had the effect that an important form of coordination -the capacity to quote a price for a financial instrument not as a dollar amount but as a level of a more stable and more comprehensible theoretical parameter such as implied volatility or base correlation -has been more limited in the CDO market than in the option market. Street; rather, what happened was that the entire, huge, highly-ordered pattern of coordinated sociotechnical behaviour that the Gaussian copula helped foster turned disastrously self-undermining.
5 They are not, in fact, entirely homogeneous: see MacKenzie (1993) .
